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I. INTRODUCTION: CY PRES AND THE PROBLEMS OF FASHIONING
CLASS–WIDE RELIEF
The purpose of the modern class action, a procedural aggregation
device authorized by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is to
collectivize individual claims into a single proceeding, with the
overwhelming majority of the plaintiffs assuming a purely passive role in
the proceeding. The procedure is thereby designed to assure efficient
resolution of claims too numerous to be joined and too burdensome to be
litigated individually. As worthwhile as this concept may sound in theory,
however, the harsh realities of the modern class action have demonstrated
that its implementation has been far from simple in practice.
In many class actions, the claims of the individual class members are
extremely small. Of course, one might argue that it is for exactly such
claims that the class action procedure is so well suited, for the very reason
that individual suit in such cases would be infeasible.1 The serious
complicating factor, however, is that notifying individual class members of
their right to file a claim into a class–wide settlement or award fund will
often prove to be both difficult and inefficient. Moreover, even when
individual class members have received notification of their rights to
compensation from a general fund, their claims will often be so small that
their size fails to justify the effort and expense of pursuing those claims on
an individual basis. Finally, since generally individual class members will
have become part of the class not by affirmatively choosing to enter it but
1. Such suits are usually referred to as “negative value” or “Type B” claims. In contrast,
class claims large enough to stand on their own are referred to as “Type A” claims. See MARTIN H.
REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS
ACTION LAWSUIT 131–32 (2009).
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rather by failing to opt out of the class, 2 the court can never be certain that
the absent class members are even fully aware of their inclusion in the
class in the first place. This is so despite the fact that they likely received
formal notification of the suit.
If, for these reasons, a large majority of claimants never receive
compensation for the harm defendants have inflicted, courts might fear that
even defendants who have been found liable may never have to pay for
their violations of the law. Courts, plaintiffs’ attorneys, and class action
scholars have therefore struggled to come up with radical ways in which
defendants in class actions can be forced to pay for their violations of the
law.3 The desire to fashion such relief may be understandable, given the
available alternatives to these creative remedial developments. Absent
resort to such radical fashioning of relief, four alternatives would appear to
exist: (1) having the remainder of the unclaimed fund revert to the
defendant, who, presumably the court has already determined, has violated
the law; (2) allowing the unclaimed portion of the damage fund to escheat
to the state, much as most unclaimed property does after a specified period
of time; (3) increasing the pro-rata share of the class members who do file
claims until the remainder of the damage fund is consumed; or (4) refusing
to authorize the class proceeding in the first place. Under alternatives 1 and
4, whatever deterrent effect the substantive law was designed to have will
either be completely defeated or at the very least seriously diluted.
Alternative 2 may well achieve the substantive law’s goal of deterrence,
since the defendant is still forced to pay fully for the harm it has caused.
However, it will likely not come close to compensating or aiding the
2. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (requiring notice and the right of absent class members to opt out
in Rule 23(b)(3) classes). In class suits falling within the Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) categories, optout is not permitted. Id.
3. For a discussion of one of these alternative methods, so-called “fluid class recovery,” see
infra Part V. Note that often these creative methods are employed as part of a settlement between
the parties, rather than as part of a coercive judicial award against a defendant. However, our
criticisms of these creative damage alternatives draw no distinction between the two contexts, for
three reasons. First, any settlement agreed to by a class defendant is entered into in the shadow of
controlling substantive and procedural law that would likely be applied were the suit to be litigated.
Thus, a defendant’s agreement to use of an alternative method of collective relief cannot be deemed
a purely voluntary act if one assumes that a court possesses the legal authority to impose such relief
coercively on a defendant as part of a fully litigated action. At the very least, then, before such a
settlement could be accepted as a truly voluntary agreement by a defendant, it would need to be
firmly established that such relief would be unavailable as court ordered litigation relief. Second, in
any event, under Rule 23(e) a court must supervise and approve any settlement of a class action.
Thus, unlike a settlement of an individual suit where the parties have totally free reign to enter into
an extra-judicial contract as a means of resolving the action, in settlement of a class suit the court’s
inherent and pervasive involvement effectively renders the settlement an action of the court, rather
than merely a voluntary agreement entered by the parties. Finally, even in the settlement context the
due process rights of absent class members are implicated, and for reasons that will be discussed,
most of these alternative compensation methodologies will present serious threats to those rights.
See infra Part IV.C.
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victims who have been injured by the defendant’s unlawful behavior.
Finally, alternative 3 amounts to an unjustified windfall to the plaintiffs
who have filed claims, since they will receive considerably more than their
properly allotted damages.
In place of what many perceive to be unsatisfying alternatives, courts
and scholars have proposed a variety of radical methods to determine and
administer class–wide relief. Usually, the terms used to describe these
radical methods are “fluid class recovery” or “cy pres,” with the two
concepts on occasion being treated by courts and commentators as
fungible.4 While a broad definition of both concepts does render them
largely equivalent, it is important to discern subtle but significant
differences. As an abstract matter, both concepts refer to efforts to provide
the “next best” form of relief in cases where it is impractical or impossible
to directly compensate the injured class members. In more recent times,
however, the term cy pres has generally referred to an effort to provide
unclaimed compensatory funds to a charitable interest that is in some way
related to either the subject of the case or the interests of the victims,
broadly defined. In contrast, “fluid class recovery,” in the sense in which
we use the term here, refers to efforts to fashion relief to those who will be
impacted by the defendant in the future, in an effort to roughly
approximate the category of those who were injured in the past. Thus, both
concepts involve some form of “second best” relief. However, in the sense
we employ the terms (and as modern courts often, though not always,
employ them) fluid class recovery represents a far more disciplined effort
to indirectly compensate injured victims (through future approximations of
who those victims were) than does cy pres, which in its modern form
demands merely some generic link of the proposed recipient charity to the
nature of the suit.5
Today, of these alternative methods, cy pres relief appears to be the one
most often employed by federal class action courts. While there has been a
fair bit of legal controversy over fluid class recovery,6 there has been only
occasional concern expressed, either by courts or scholars, about the
dramatic turn in modern class actions toward the use of cy pres relief.
Though it is difficult to know for certain why the practice’s growth has
4. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984) (“It
was appropriate for the district court to consider the cy pres doctrine or Fluid Class Recovery to
achieve an equitable disposition of the reserve fund.”).
5. While beyond the scope of our inquiry, it is worth mentioning that in addition to cy pres
and fluid class recovery, two other methods of dealing with the impracticalities of class–wide relief
have been suggested or employed, albeit with at best limited success: (1) determination of class–
wide damages through adjudication of individual suits chosen scientifically by methods of statistical
sampling combined with class–wide extrapolation of the average findings; and (2) “liability-only”
determinations in the class proceeding itself, with damage determinations left for post-class
individualized suits.
6. See infra Part V.
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gone nearly unnoticed, much less criticized, by the scholarly world, we can
postulate a number of possible explanations. First, unlike fluid class
recovery, the cy pres concept has venerable origins in the law, having roots
in the law of estates and trusts as far back as Roman times and reaching its
zenith in the period following the Middle Ages.7 Second, unlike its biggest
remedial competitor, fluid class recovery, which is expressly designed as a
means for determining damages for an injured class, cy pres relief is
purportedly invoked merely as a means of disposing of unclaimed property.
Traditionally, the disposition of unclaimed property has been considered to
be wholly distinct from the underlying substantive law on which the
proceeding giving rise to the award was grounded.8
There are significant problems with both rationales for giving class
action cy pres a virtual free pass. Initially, while it is true that the doctrine
finds its origins in the ancient law of trusts, that historical grounding in no
way logically justifies its extension to the radically different context of
modern class action adjudication. In fact, this radical extension did not
occur until as recently as the 1970s—and even then solely by resort to
strained analogy.9
Secondly, though it is generally true that treatment of unclaimed awards
is considered conceptually distinct from the substantive merits of the
litigations that led to those awards,10 class action cy pres presents a
dramatically different situation from the normal unclaimed property
context. In the normal case, when an award is made or settlement
established, the reasonable expectation is that the plaintiffs who have
actively pursued that award by affirmatively choosing to file suit will claim
it once they have won their suit. In the relatively rare case where that does
not happen, it is perfectly reasonable to treat the unclaimed funds as the
law would treat any other unclaimed property (which usually means
escheat to the state). In the class action context, in contrast, for reasons we
will discuss, there is no such reasonable expectation.11
It is easy to grasp the role that cy pres is designed to play in
implementing and vindicating the modern class action. In its modern form,
cy pres relief is uniquely and intentionally designed to bridge the often
enormous gap between a finding of liability and the distribution of
damages in a class action. Indeed, in many class actions it is solely the use
of cy pres that assures distribution of a class settlement or award fund
sufficiently large to guarantee substantial attorneys’ fees and to make the
entire class proceeding seemingly worthwhile. Absent the possibility of a
sizable award to charity created by cy pres, plaintiffs’ attorneys and courts
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
Id.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part II.B.4.
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might reasonably fear that many of these class proceedings would be
widely perceived as failing either to punish the wrongdoer or compensate
the victims. Absent a public perception of success, class action advocates
could reason, the viability of the modern class action as a weapon against
corporate illegality could be seriously undermined. Therefore, class action
attorneys and supporters might believe that with cy pres, the class
proceeding still punishes the wrongdoer and that even if it fails to
compensate actual victims, at the very least it uses the wrongdoer’s money
for worthy purposes. In this important sense, use of cy pres represents an
integral—indeed, often essential—element of the class action process,
rather than merely a neutral method of unclaimed property disposition that
happens to be applied in the class action context.
It is this integral role of cy pres that renders it so troubling a part of the
modern class action. In a variety of ways, use of cy pres threatens to create
or foster “pathologies” of the modern class action. By the term
“pathology,” we refer to three different harms to the interests of the
nation’s constitutional democracy which the modern class action can be
distorted to bring about: a use of the class proceeding that is either (1)
inconsistent with the limits of the procedure’s legal source—i.e., the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as the Rules Enabling Act,12
which authorizes and limits creation of those rules; (2) a perversion or
distortion of the underlying substantive law being enforced in the class
proceeding; or (3) a violation of the constitutional dictates that control and
limit the procedure. These “pathologies” derive from threats to the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III,13 the dictates of separation of
powers that inhere in the Constitution’s limited grants of authority to each
branch of federal government, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.14 Thus, the “pathologies” of the modern class action, then,
refer to all the ways in which the class action has been structured or
applied to exceed the bounds of the limitations legally placed upon it in
order to preserve both constitutional democratic values and the rule of law.
Cy pres furthers the pathologies of the modern class action in two
important ways—what can appropriately be labeled “intrinsic” and
“instrumental.” The former term concerns pathologies to which use of cy
pres inherently gives rise, while the latter involves ways in which cy pres
facilitates or provides cover for political and constitutional pathologies
associated with the modern class action itself. In both contexts, cy pres
gives rise to serious problems of constitutional law and democratic theory.
By awarding defendant’s money to a charity, cy pres introduces into the
class adjudication an artificially interested party who has suffered no injury
at the hands of the defendant. In so doing cy pres contravenes the adversary
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss3/2

6

Redish et al.: Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of Modern Class Action: A Norm

2010]

CY PRES RELIEF AND THE PATHOLOGIES OF THE MODERN CLASS ACTION

623

“bilateralism” constitutionally required by the adjudicatory process
embodied in Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.15 Use of cy pres
simultaneously violates the constitutional dictates of separation of powers
by employing a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure to alter the compensatory
enforcement mechanism dictated by the applicable substantive law being
enforced in the class action proceeding. It has somehow become common
practice among many courts, scholars, and members of the public to view
the modern class action as a free-standing device, designed to do justice
and police corporate evildoers.16 As nothing more than a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, however, the class action device may do no more than
enforce existing substantive law as promulgated either by Congress or, in
diversity suits, by applicable state statutory or common law. Yet in no
instance of which we are aware does the underlying substantive law sought
to be enforced in a federal class action direct a violator to pay damages to
an uninjured charity.
In addition to evincing its own inherent constitutional pathologies, cy
pres simultaneously facilitates the flaws and defects in general class action
jurisprudence, and in this sense operates instrumentally. Cy pres creates the
illusion of class compensation. It is employed when—and only when—
absent its use, the class proceeding would be little more than a mockery.
To be sure, the defendants would still gain the protections of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, and the class attorneys would most assuredly still
get at least some fees. But in cases in which cy pres is deemed necessary it
is very likely that the bulk of the class of victims will go uncompensated.
This is due to the simple fact that, purely as a practical matter, in at least
certain situations there simply exists no way that a class proceeding can
effectively aggregate and satisfy the small claims of individual right
holders. Yet when the class action court introduces a wholly extraneous but
sympathetic charitable actor into the suit, purportedly on the basis of its
authority under a procedural rule, the redistributive goals of the substantive
law are somehow assumed to be satisfied. But the substantive law
authorizes no such relief; no legislative body has expressly chosen to
abandon its compensatory enforcement mode in favor of some directive of
a charitable contribution as punishment for a defendant’s unlawful
behavior. Cy pres, then, is far more than the neutral disposition of
unclaimed property that it is thought to be.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part II explores
the origins of cy pres in the law of trusts, and its transformation—in a
radically different form—in the modern class action. Part III then considers
the serious structural and constitutional problems to which use of cy pres
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see infra Part III.B.
16. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 913, 916–18 (1998) (arguing that classes should be conceptualized as the equivalent
of business associations).
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gives rise, in both the intrinsic and instrumental senses. Part IV examines
the available empirical evidence concerning the use of cy pres in the
modern class action. Because of the limited data available we make no
claim that our empirical findings provide scientific support for our
conclusions. They nevertheless provide valuable insights into the manner
in which class action cy pres fosters the pathological aspects of the modern
class action. Part V contrasts a fluid class recovery model with cy pres. Our
analysis leads to the ultimate conclusion that resort to cy pres in the class
action context contravenes important constitutional and procedural
limitations, and must therefore be rejected. Indeed, we conclude that use of
cy pres threatens core notions of our constitutional democratic system. Its
use in the modern class action must therefore be rejected.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CY PRES: FROM CHARITABLE TRUSTS TO
CLASS ACTIONS
A. The Origins of Cy Pres
The term “cy pres” derives from the French expression “cy pres comme
possible,” which means “as near as possible.” Cy pres developed originally
in the law of trusts, where it is deeply rooted.17 It was only by way of
recent analogy that cy pres was introduced into the area of class actions.18
After class action practice was revolutionized by the amendments to Rule
23 developed by the Rules Advisory Committee and adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1966,19 large damage classes with large numbers of
small claims held by claimants who had made no affirmative choice to
participate in the class proceeding became a relatively common occurrence.
Both courts and attorneys quickly became aware that there would be
serious problems actually getting awards or settlements from defendants to
their victims, or, in the alternative, at least finding some worthwhile way to
dispose of those funds. By the early 1970s, scholarly commentary began to
suggest drawing an analogy to cy pres in the law of trusts for these
purposes, and it was expressly adopted by a number of state and federal
courts starting in the mid–1970s and 1980s.20 Wholly apart from the
serious practical and conceptual problems to which the use of cy pres in the
class action context gives rise,21 one may reasonably question the very
basis for the analogy between cy pres in the law of trusts and cy pres in the
class action context. In numerous ways, the trusts and class actions
contexts are the equivalent of apples and oranges. To understand the
logically faulty nature of the analogy, however, it is first necessary to
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.
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explore the origins and development of cy pres in both contexts. This Part
will trace the history of cy pres, first in the law of trusts, and then its
development in class actions.
1. The Development of Cy Pres in Trust Law
Pursuant to cy pres in its original context of trust law, when a valid
charitable trust specified a charitable gift that had been rendered
impossible or impractical because of exigent circumstances, courts would
attempt to give effect to the testator’s intent by putting the funds to the next
closest use.22 For example, if a testator designated funds for a school for
orphans in Chicago, but no such school existed, then a court may give the
funds to a school for orphans in nearby Cicero in an effort to find a charity
that is closest to the testator’s intent.
The origins of cy pres are obscured by time, but it appears that the
precursor of the modern form of cy pres originated in sixth century
Rome.23 Justinian’s Digest contained a passage directing that a charitable
gift given to celebrate games that had since become illegal be put to a legal
use to keep the deceased’s memory alive. In more modern times, much of
cy pres’ development in England derives from a combination of the special
place held by charitable gifts in history and the historical connection
between trusts and the church.24 In fourteenth century England, it was
understood that a dying man would often discuss with his priest where he
wanted to be buried and how he wanted to distribute his estate, which the
church was responsible for administering.25 The man frequently made a
charitable bequest because of “his own concern for the future of his
soul.”26 The church established a custom that any property left without a
specific designation would be used “‘pro salute animae’”—“for the good
of the testator’s soul.”27 From this premise, it was only a relatively short
step to the classic doctrine of cy pres: where the testator’s dying
designation could not reasonably or legally be achieved, authorities would
seek out the closest feasible alternative.
Scholars have suggested two theories to explain why England adopted
cy pres. The first asserts that cy pres derives from society’s preference for
charities above all other institutions.28 Because of this preference, courts
gave charitable gifts special treatment and began to give gifts to charities
22. Edith L. Fisch, The Cy Press Doctrine in the United States § 1.00 (Matthew Bender
1950).
23. Id. § 1.02.
24. Hamish Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres Principle in
Charities, 33 B.U. L. REV. 30, 32 (1953).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 32.
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the same consideration as gifts to persons.29 Accordingly, a gift to a charity
that was rendered impossible was to be accomplished in another way,
much like a gift to a person who had died might pass to the person’s
heirs.30 Under this theory, cy pres developed naturally out of the law that
provided charities special status.
A second possible theory for English trust law’s adoption of cy pres is
grounded in the relationship between the church and the courts.31
Following the reformation, charities were controlled by the chancellor,32
who was a legal official deemed heir to ecclesiastical knowledge, including
the Roman law that provided for ensuring that charitable trusts do not fail
in order to ensure the perpetuation of the testator’s memory.33 In the
Middle Ages, individuals purchased their salvation through indulgences
from the church.34 If a testator’s charitable intent was motivated in part by
the desire to purchase an indulgence, church officials may have reasoned
that allowing the trust to fail, thereby failing to give effect to the testator’s
intent, would unjustly deprive the deceased of salvation. This would have
been considered an especially unjust result, since the loss of salvation
under these circumstances would not have been the fault of the deceased.35
Even if the original motivation for the trust’s creator was not receipt of an
indulgence, the church may have reasoned that denying a person an
improved chance at salvation was unjust. Under this theory, scholars
hypothesize, because the chancellor simultaneously served as an official of
the church, he would have had the twin incentives of saving the person’s
soul and keeping the funds within the church.36 This combination of piety
and greed may have prompted the creation of cy pres in the English law.37
Thus, while the precise path that lead to the adoption of cy pres in England
has been lost to the ages, both theories concur that the adoption was
motivated by a historical presumption favoring charity.
2. Two Forms of Cy Pres in England
In England, cy pres took two forms: judicial and prerogative.38 Judicial
29. FISCH, supra note 22, § 1.03; see Gray, supra note 24, at 30 (“One of the striking
distinctions which the Law draws between the Private Trust and the Charitable Trust is found in the
principle that in circumstances in which a Private Trust would be defeated a Charitable Trust is not
allowed to fail.”).
30. FISCH, supra note 22, § 1.03.
31. Gray, supra note 24, at 32.
32. Id.
33. See id.
34. FISCH, supra note 22, § 1.03.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 309 (1939).
38. FISCH, supra note 22, § 1.01.
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cy pres was exercised exclusively by the chancellor, who would examine
the underlying intent behind a filed charitable trust whose directive could
not, for whatever reason, be implemented.39 Once the chancellor had
determined that intent, he would designate the trust’s corpus to a charity or
worthy project that most closely approximated the testator’s intent behind
the original gift.40 For example, if a testator designated a gift to an
astronomy department at a college, but the department had closed before
the testator’s death, the chancellor would attempt to determine the
testator’s intent behind the gift. If he concluded that the intent had been to
give the funds to astronomy research, then he would donate the funds to an
astronomy department at another college. If, on the other hand, he decided
that the intent was to give the funds to the particular college, then he would
donate the funds to another department at the same college.
The other form of the doctrine, prerogative cy pres, was exercised by
the king as parens patriae.41 Unlike the narrow discretion afforded the
chancellor under judicial cy pres, under prerogative cy pres the king could,
in his discretion, appropriate failed charitable gifts and designate the funds
to other, usually marginally related purposes.42 Later, the chancellor
assumed the King’s prerogative, acting as his proxy.43 Prerogative cy pres
was invoked when no option was available that would approximate the
testator’s intent or the intent was to donate to an illegal activity.44 An
example is the case of Da Costa v. De Pas.45 There a decedent had, during
his life, designated a sum of money to establish a yeshiva (a Jewish
religious school) in England.46 At the time of the decedent’s death, no gift
could be given to any religious institution other than the Church of
England.47 The chancellor, acting as a proxy for the king, appropriated the
gift for the purpose of instructing boys in the Christian religion at a
foundling hospital.48
3. Cy Pres in American Trust Law
The adoption of cy pres in America was restrained by a fear that it
would vest too much power in the judiciary.49 This perception was inspired
39. Comment, supra note 37, at 304–05.
40. Id. at 305.
41. FISCH, supra note 22, § 2.03, at 56–57.
42. Id. This seems to foreshadow some of the marginally related uses of cy pres in the class
action context. See infra Parts II.B.3, III.
43. FISCH, supra note 22, § 2.03, at 56–57.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 2.03, at 60.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 2.03, at 60–61. These concerns foreshadow some of the pathologies endemic to cy
pres in the class action context. See infra Part III.
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in large part by the perceived abuses associated with prerogative cy pres,50
and some were concerned that courts would change wills and bequests for
mere convenience.51 The slow pace of adoption of cy pres in America was
also due in part to the fact that American courts misconstrued the impact of
the English Statute of Charitable Uses on cy pres.52 This statute codified
the English cy pres common law, but many early American legal scholars
mistook it for the exclusive source of the cy pres doctrine in English law.53
Eventually, in Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Ass’n v. Hart’s
Executors, the Supreme Court incorrectly resolved confusion over whether
cy pres was an equitable doctrine independent of the Statute of Charitable
Uses.54 The Court held that the doctrine was grounded only in the statute.55
A number of states based their decision to reject cy pres on the Court’s
decision in Hart’s Executors,56 while other states rejected the law of
charitable trusts in their case law.57 In later years, states began slowly to
“judicially affirm[]” cy pres.58 Currently forty-six states and the District of
Columbia have codified judicial cy pres.59 Eighteen of those states adopted

50. See supra text accompanying notes 38–41.
51. See FISCH, supra note 22, § 2.03, at 59–60.
52. Id. § 2.01, at 9–10.
53. Gray, supra note 24, at 36.
54. 17 U.S. 1 (1819).
55. FISCH, supra note 22, § 2.01 at 12.
56. Id. §§ 2.01(a)–(e).
57. Id. §§ 2.01–2.03.
58. Id. § 3.00 at 92.
59. ALA.CODE § 19-3B-413 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-413 (West 2009);
CAL.PROB.CODE § 15409 (West 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-535e (West 2009); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3541 (2009); D.C. CODE § 19-1304.13 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1010.10
(West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-113 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 517E-6(b) (West
2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-5006 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-3-27 (West 2009); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 633A.5102 (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-413 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 273.570 (West 2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2331 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-B,
§ 413 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-209 (2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214,
§ 10B (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.31 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-11-613
(West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.4-413 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-504 (2009);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN, § 30-3839 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498:4-a (2009); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 15:18-30 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-4-413 (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 36C-4-413 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-13 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.12
(West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 76 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 130.210 (West
2009); 20 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7740.3 (West 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-4-1 (2009); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-31-1107 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-9-4 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-10-206
(West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-413 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 413 (2009); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-544.13 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 35-2-2 (West 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 701.10 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-414 (2009). In re Estate of Vallery, 883 P.2d 24,
29 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); In re Estate of Tomlinson, 359 N.E.2d 109, 112 (Ill. 1976); In re Estate
of Rood, 200 N.W.2d 728, 735 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Conway v. Bowe, 116 N.Y.S.2d 182, 188
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1952); Moody v. Haas, 493 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
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the Uniform Trust Code version of cy pres60 (and three of the four states
which codified cy pres previously had such statutes).61
States generally require that three factors be established before courts
may invoke cy pres in the enforcement of charitable trusts: (1) the gift must
constitute a valid charitable trust; (2) the specified gift must be impossible
or impractical; and (3) the testator must have a charitable intent in making
the gift.62 The first element must satisfy two requirements: first, a
charitable trust must have been created, and second, the trust must be
valid.63 A trust is invalid if the language makes it impossible to determine
who the recipient is supposed to be, if execution of the trust would require
the legislature pass or repeal a law, or if the trust would violate a law.64 For
the second element, a court may not find a trust impractical or impossible
merely because its execution would be inconvenient, or the number of
beneficiaries is declining, or for any other reason that unnecessarily distorts
the testator’s intent.65 A court may attempt to carry out the trust until the
gift becomes impossible, or it may invoke cy pres immediately upon its
realization that the goal of the trust will inevitably become impossible or
impractical to achieve.66 The third element, that the testator must have a
60. U.T.C. § 413 (2005), which provides as follows:
(a)
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if a particular
charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to
achieve, or wasteful:
(1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part;
(2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor or the
settlor’s successors in interest; and
(3) the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the
trust by directing that the trust property be applied or
distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent
with the settlor’s charitable purposes.
(b)
A provision in the terms of a charitable trust that would result in
distribution of the trust property to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails
over the power of the court under subsection (a) to apply cy pres to
modify or terminate the trust only if, when the provision takes effect:
(1) the trust property is to revert to the settlor and the settlor
is still living; or
(2) fewer than 21 years have elapsed since the date of the
trust’s creation.
61. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010 (repealed 1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10413 (repealed
2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 24.44.060 (repealed 2009).
62. FISCH, supra note 22, § 5.00.
63. Id. § 5.01.
64. Id. § 5.01(b). If only the particular gift is illegal, but the general purpose of the trust is
legal, then this does not make the trust invalid. Id. § 5.01(b), at 136.
65. Id. § 5.02.
66. Id.
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charitable intent, is the most controversial of the three because it requires
judges to engage in an exercise akin to mind reading.67 Generally, courts
will find this requirement not met if the gift is made for a non-charitable
purpose.68 Because of the difficulties in applying the third element, some
states have limited or discarded it.69 In Pennsylvania, the charitable intent
requirement was legislatively removed from the state’s cy pres
requirements, and in Connecticut the state supreme court did away with the
requirement.70 Massachusetts has a strong presumption that the
requirement is satisfied, unless another intent is expressed in the bequest.71
B. Application of Cy Pres to the Class Action Context
1. The Origins of Class Action Cy Pres
In its original form and for centuries thereafter, the cy pres doctrine was
never thought to have anything to do with the structuring of relief awarded
against a defendant who had been judicially found in an adversary
proceeding to have violated the legal rights of the plaintiff. Its context,
rather, was confined exclusively to the law of trusts and estates; it played
no role in the adjudication of legal claims in an adversary setting. It most
assuredly was never associated with either group litigation or the class
action procedure. Thus, while the doctrine of cy pres has a venerable
history in its original format, use of a venerable label cannot hide the
practice’s radical nature in the class action context.
In 1966, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was amended to
dramatically revise and expand the class action procedure.72 The drafters
recognized that, largely due either to inertia or confusion, many potential
class members would fail to respond to notification of a class action.
However, they reasoned that class members’ silence did not necessarily
reflect a choice not to participate in the suit. Therefore the amended rule
provided that in non-mandatory classes,73 absent class member inaction
would lead to inclusion in, rather than exclusion from, the class.74
67. Id. § 5.03(b).
68. Id.
69. Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States: From Extreme
Reluctance to Affirmative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 471, 476 (1998).
70. See generally Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304 (Conn. 1993) (interpreting the
Connecticut version of the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act).
71. Rudko, supra note 69, at 476.
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c).
73. Classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are mandatory, meaning that class
members do not have the choice to remove themselves from the class. It is only in classes certified
under Rule 23(b)(3) that potential class members are given the right to opt out.
74. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98 (1967); Martin H. Redish, Class
Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public
Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 101–03 (2003) (criticizing the role of inertia in class actions).
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In cases in which a class–wide award is made or a class–wide
settlement fund created, individual class members must be compensated
out of the damage fund that has been established. On some occasions this
will be more difficult than others. For example, where it is difficult to find
the class members, or the amounts of their claims are too small or the
paperwork required too burdensome to justify the effort required for them
to collect from the fund, much of the fund will likely remain unclaimed.
Courts therefore faced the problem of what to do with the unclaimed
funds.75 Traditionally, such funds would revert to a defendant—often an
unpopular result because reversion of the funds undermines the deterrent
effect of the suit and leaves the defendant largely with the benefit of his
illegal activity.76 This concern, combined with the desire to avoid
compensating only a small percentage of class members who responded to
notifications about class actions, led courts and commentators to seek to
develop innovative ways to compensate injured class members. Only by
doing so could they avoid allowing unlawful behavior to go unpunished.
Use of the cy pres doctrine in the class action context can be traced
largely to a pioneering student Comment, published in the University of
Chicago Law Review in 1972.77 There it was argued that “[w]hen
distribution problems arise in large class actions, courts may seek to apply
their own version of cy pres by effectuating as closely as possible the intent
of the legislature in providing the legal remedies on which the main cause
of action was based.”78 The writer saw three general ways in which
traditional cy pres could be applied in the class action context as a means
of disposing of uncollected damages: “(1) distribution to those class
members who come forward to collect their damages, (2) distribution
through the state in its capacity as parens patriae or by escheat, and (3)
distribution through the market.”79 The first option meant that the share of
those plaintiffs who did file claims could be proportionally increased to
consume the uncollected funds. The second option provided that either the
unclaimed funds could simply escheat to the state or instead be utilized in a
form of “conditional escheat,” meaning that the funds could go to the state
on the condition that the state agreed to use the funds for the general
benefit of citizens in the position of the plaintiff class members. The third
option described what we call “future approximation fluid class recovery”:
75. Kaplan, supra note 74, at 398.
76. See, e.g., Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class
Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1594–95 (1987); Stewart R. Shepherd, Comment, Damage
Distribution in Class Actions:The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 448 (1972). For an
example of a case where the remainder reverted to the defendant, see Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery,
102 F.2d 58, 61–62 (7th Cir. 1939) (finding that a telephone company is entitled to keep $1.69
million of damage fund that was not claimed).
77. See generally Shepherd, supra note 76 (discussing the cy pres remedy).
78. Id. at 452.
79. Id. at 453.
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the judicial direction of future price reductions in an effort to provide relief
to future users and thus, approximately capture the injured class members
on the assumption that future users are likely to roughly include most past
users. 80
The Comment acknowledged that the first option, increasing the share
of the class members who made claims, may provide the next best solution
because it would ensure that the recipients of the funds were individuals
who had suffered similar harm to that suffered by the uncompensated
absent class members, and avoid reducing the deterrent effect on the
defendant or unjustly enriching him.81 Yet there are significant concerns
with this form of distribution.82 “[T]his method expressly contemplates
that silent class members will not receive any compensation, even
indirectly,” and the class members who made claims would be unjustly
enriched at the expense of the absent class members.83 Furthermore, use of
this approach could create a perverse incentive among victims to bring
suits where large numbers of absent class members were unlikely to make
claims. It might also create an incentive for the represented class members
to keep information from the absent class members.84
Under the second option—distribution through the state85—the court
would direct the unclaimed funds to be given to the state, to be used for the
benefit of the citizens generally or for a designated social purpose.86 An
example of a court giving the funds to the state for a designated purpose,
what could be termed “conditional escheat,” is the decision in West
Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.87 In that case, the notice by publication to
consumer members of the class stated that if they failed to make an
individual claim in ninety days, “‘that [failure] will constitute an
authorization to the Attorney General [or other government official] to
utilize whatever money he may recover as your representative for the
benefit of the citizens of your State in such manner as the Court may
direct.’”88 The attorney general recommended using the funds to establish
public health projects.89 Despite the fact that the underlying action was an
80. Unlike cy pres, where funds are awarded to a charitable third party, “fluid class recovery”
is used to indirectly compensate class members when direct compensation is impracticable. For a
detailed analysis of fluid class recovery and its relationship to cy pres, see infra Part V.
81. Shepherd, supra note 76, at 453.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The concern expressed in the Comment foreshadowed the problems of faux class actions,
but failed to recognize the similar issues that would arise from the use of cy pres in class actions.
See infra Part IV.B.
85. Shepherd, supra note 76, at 453.
86. Id. at 453–54.
87. 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. Id. at 1083 (quoting district court order).
89. Shepherd, supra note 76, at 457.
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antitrust suit involving the drug tetracycline, the suggested projects
included “drug abuse programs, community health clinics, and lead
poisoning and sickle cell anemia research, which the attorney regard[ed] as
areas of need for which adequate funding is not politically feasible.”90
The Comment recognized that putting the funds to a use that would
more directly benefit the absent class members would provide a better
analogy to a cy pres remedy.91 Nonetheless, it argued that when a close
approximation of the actual class is unavailable, “there is sufficient
flexibility in the cy pres doctrine to permit the state to allocate the funds to
other programs designed to maximize public benefit.”92 The Comment also
acknowledged that directing the use of funds for a specific purpose may
give rise to objection because any additional benefits to the absent class
members may be “quite remote,” and of no more direct benefit than
general escheat to the state.93 Finally, problems exist concerning oversight
of the use of the funds to ensure they are used for the benefit of the class.94
2. Development of the Modern Form of Class Action Cy Pres
Under the version of class action cy pres originally proposed in the
University of Chicago Law Review Comment in 1972, the acceptability of
a cy pres remedy was to be measured by “(1) the extent to which the
injured class receives the damages, (2) the [administrative] cost of applying
the remedy, and (3) the equitability of the distribution with respect to the
potential of windfalls for nonclass members.”95 Also, as originally
contemplated, cy pres would be used only in large classes with unclaimed
remainders.96
Although the initial scholarly suggestion of some form of class action
cy pres came in 1972, at that time no thought seems to have been given to
creation of the current version of the doctrine. In its original context of
trusts and estates, it should be recalled, cy pres was employed in an effort
to find the “next best” means of achieving the testator’s or benefactor’s
charitable purpose when enforcement of his original directive had become
infeasible. In one sense or another, each of the three alternatives originally
proposed in 1972 sought to find the “next best” means of compensating
absent class members when it was impractical or impossible to compensate
them directly. However, in 1987 two student Notes argued that remainders
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 458.
94. Id. at 455. The Comment recognized that distribution of the funds to the state “would
appear to be more like a fine or penalty than like compensatory damages.” Id. However, the
Comment did not find these concerns sufficiently severe to warrant the rejection of cy pres
distributions to the state. Id. at 456.
95. Id. at 464.
96. Id.
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from class actions should be donated to charitable purposes, even where
such a donation was, at best, only remotely designed to benefit the injured
class members.97 Both Notes conceived of cy pres as a freestanding
alternative to class action remedies in “small claim consumer class
actions.”98 Under this form of cy pres, funds would be used to create a
charitable trust, and that trust would be used either to create a charitable
foundation or donate to a pre-existing charitable organization related in
some way (however loosely) to the subject of the class action suit.99 The
benefit of charitable trust cy pres, according to these notewriters, is that the
defendant is fully disgorged of his unlawful gains, the distribution costs do
not devastate the recovery fund, and the disgorged funds are used for
beneficial purposes related in some way to the harm caused by the
defendants.100
At this later stage of its development, class action cy pres began to take
on a subtly altered tone. The “next best” relief was no longer focused
wholly on finding an alternative means of indirectly compensating victims
who could not feasibly be compensated directly, but rather simply on
seeking a beneficial use of the compensatory funds exacted from the
defendant. This transformation makes all the difference in the world in
determining the current practice’s legitimacy and constitutionality. As
modified, cy pres improperly transforms the legal DNA of both the
underlying substantive law being enforced in the class proceeding and the
structural framework of the adversary process imposed by Article III of the
Constitution.101 Before we can effectively explore the serious—and
ultimately fatal—pathologies of class action cy pres, however, it is first
necessary to understand the manner in which the original form of cy pres,
established in the law of trusts, has been misused by federal class action
courts.
3. Judicial Development of Class Action Cy Pres
In its current form as used in the federal courts, cy pres relief in class
actions has involved the donation of a portion of the settlement or award
fund to charitable uses which are in some loose manner connected to the
substance of the case. Courts seem to feel no need to find a form of relief
that will ultimately have the effect of indirectly compensating as-yet
uncompensated class members.

97. Barnett, supra note 76, at 1600; Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A
Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 732
(1987).
98. Barnett, supra note 76, at 1594.
99. Id. at 1605; DeJarlais, supra note 97, at 759.
100. Barnett, supra note 76, at 1600; DeJarlais, supra note 97, at 767.
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (requiring cases or controversies); see infra Part IV.A.
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The earliest judicial use of some form of cy pres in the class action
context came in 1974 in the Southern District of New York’s decision in
Miller v. Steinbach.102 The suit was brought on behalf of the owners of
4,167,302 shares of Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation (BLH) stock
against a company with which the shareholders’ company had merged. The
complaint alleged that the terms of the merger had been unfair and that the
securities laws had been violated.103 In approving a proposed class
settlement, the court noted that
[i]n view of the very modest size of the settlement fund and
the vast number of shares among which it would have to be
divided, the parties have agreed instead . . . to pay the fund to
the Trustee of the BLH Retirement Plan, applying a variant of
the cy pres doctrine at common law.104
The court reasoned that “while neither counsel nor the Court has
discovered precedent for the proposal,” neither had it “been made aware of
any precedent that would prohibit it.”105 Concluding that “no alternative is
realistically possible,” the court deemed the settlement “fair and
reasonable.”106
Miller provides a valuable illustration of the important dichotomy we
draw between charitable cy pres relief—the category in which virtually all
of the recent uses of cy pres in class actions fit—and creative efforts to find
alternative or indirect means of compensating absent class members when
direct compensation is infeasible. In the former category, the cy pres award
of unclaimed damage funds is made to a charitable institution that has, at
best, some loose connection to the subject matter of the suit. No effort is
made to assure the court that by donating to that charity it will be indirectly
benefiting the absent class members who had not been directly
compensated. In contrast, under fluid class recovery the measure of the
chosen relief is the extent to which it actually approximates through future
relief those who had been injured in the past.107
It is clear that courts in the cy pres cases make no such effort. In Miller,
for example, the court made no effort to assure itself that by donating
unclaimed funds to the BLH retirement fund, the settlement’s award was
likely to indirectly compensate members of the injured class. For the
settlement to have achieved that end, the court would first have had to find
that most BLH shareholders were in fact BLH employees who would
benefit from the retirement fund, and correspondingly that most BLH
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

No. 66 Civ. 356, 1974 WL 350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1974).
Id. at *1.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at *2.
Id.
See infra Part V.
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employees (those who would benefit from an award to the retirement fund)
were BLH shareholders. While for all we know this might well have been
the case, no finding to this effect was explicitly made by the court, nor did
the answer to that question seem to be of any importance to the court. In
this manner, Miller illustrates the focus of the courts that have employed
the charitable award version of cy pres in the class action context: putting
the defendant’s funds to valuable and worthwhile use, rather than
necessarily compensating the absent class members.
Another example of the charitable version of cy pres is the California
state court decision, Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services.108 There,
pursuant to a settlement order the majority of the settlement funds were
donated to an organization that educated consumers on credit transactions.
The court reasoned that such a distribution would provide a greater benefit
to the class plaintiffs than would individual distributions.109 The fact
remains, however, that such a “benefit” to the class represented a far more
attenuated form of “compensation” than would individual distributions.
An even stronger illustration of the attenuated connection between the
direct interests of the class members and the charity receiving the cy pres
award is the federal district court decision in In re Compact Disc Minimum

108. No. NCC 11933 B (Los Angeles Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1984).
109. Id. Yet another illustration is Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 80 F.R.D. 32, 46 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
[W]e are sufficiently impressed with the prospects of an agency system
that we will apply the cy pres doctrine and order that the unclaimed
Vecchione payback funds (now totalling some $250,000) be applied to a
pilot program testing the feasibility of an agency system. If the pilot
project proves successful, we trust that the Commonwealth will move
towards that system, even if only because it promises to be less
expensive than guardianship.
In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1254 (7th Cir. 1984), the court overturned
a charitable cy pres award, directed by the district court, to establish a foundation to study antitrust
law. However, the appellate court’s concern appeared not to have been with the general idea of
charitable cy pres but rather with the wisdom of the specific award.
[E]stablishment of the proposed Foundation[, the court said,] would be
carrying coals to Newcastle. There has already been voluminous
research with respect to multidistrict antitrust litigation and the
substantive and procedural aspects of the antitrust laws by judges,
lawyer specialists, law schools, bar associations, Congressional
committees, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade
Commission, and it is a continuing project of all those concerned. In our
view, establishing an unneeded Foundation for these purposes from the
reserve fund would be a miscarriage of justice and an abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 1254–55.
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Advertised Price Antitrust Litigation. 110 There the court in a compact disc
advertised price antitrust litigation authorized a cy pres award to the
National Guild of the Community School of the Arts.111 There was no way
that the designation even arguably compensated injured victims, directly or
indirectly, in any recognizable way. Similarly, in a class suit concerning
infant formula a cy pres award was made to the American Red Cross
Disaster Relief Fund.112 Along the same lines are the decisions in In re
Wells Fargo Securities Litigation,113 where a federal district court made a
cy pres award to the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse,114 and in Jones v. National Distillers,115 where the court
awarded a cy pres award from a securities fraud suit to a legal aid society
because it was more related to the subject matter of the suit than would be
“a dance performance or a zoo.”116 In none of these decisions did the
charitable designation in any way constitute even a feeble attempt to
indirectly compensate victims.
Although district courts usually look favorably upon the use of cy pres
in class actions, appellate courts have not always been as receptive to the
practice. Indeed, on occasion appellate courts have expressly recognized its
potential for abuse.117 For example, one appellate court overturned a cy
pres distribution when the district court had failed to consider whether the
unclaimed funds could have instead been distributed as treble damages to
class members in an antitrust case.118 Another appellate court did so
because the large amount of the cy pres settlement was merely punitive
rather than compensatory.119 Yet another did so because the defendants
110. No. MDL 1361, 2005 WL 1923446 (D.Me. Aug. 9, 2005).
111. Id. at *1.
112. In re Infant Formula Multidistrict Litig., No. 4:91-CV-00878-MP, 2005 WL 2211312, at
*1 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 8, 2005).
113. 991 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
114. Id. at 1198; see also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff’d, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971) (allowing the excess of settlement consumer fund to be
distributed to states in proportion to their population to be used for benefit of consumers in a case
involving price fixing allegations against major drug manufacturers).
115. 56 F. Supp. 2d 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
116. Id. at 359.
117. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785 (7th Cir. 2004).
Would it be too cynical to speculate that what may be going on here is
that class counsel wanted a settlement that would give them a generous
fee and Fleet wanted a settlement that would extinguish 1.4 million
claims against it at no cost to itself? The settlement that the district judge
approved sold these 1.4 million claimants down the river. Only if they
had no claim—more precisely no claim large enough to justify a
distribution to them—did they lose nothing by the settlement, and the
judge made no finding that they had no such claim.
118. Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423, 435–36 (2d Cir. 2007).
119. Mirfasihi, 356 F.3d at 784 (discussing Fair Credit Reporting Act case against
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would have been required to pay an amount disproportionate to the harm to
class members.120 The fact remains, however, that cy pres has played an
important—indeed, arguably vital—role in assuring the widespread use of
the class action device.121
4. Why Cy Pres in the Class Action Context?
With such widespread use, we may question what, exactly, are the
parties and courts seeking to accomplish by borrowing for use in class
actions a doctrine developed in entirely different substantive and
procedural contexts. It is likely that the relevant motivation comes down to
the simple fact that, in the minds of advocates of enhanced use of the class
action device, absent resort to cy pres relief generally no acceptable
alternative remedial framework exists. It is therefore probably accurate to
surmise that in the view of class action supporters, no alternative remedy
would effectively punish and deter unlawful behavior while simultaneously
dedicating defendants’ money to what are deemed socially beneficial
purposes.
The point can best be understood by considering what would happen to
unclaimed funds if cy pres relief were unavailable to a class action court.
One conceivable alternative would be reversion of the unclaimed funds to
the defendant. The Supreme Court indicated in Boeing Co. v. Van
Gemert122 that the claim of a defendant to reversion of unclaimed awards
is, as a legal matter, at least colorable.123 This alternative has been attacked
because it is thought to amount to “unjust enrichment” of the defendant.124
However, this characterization appears to misperceive the underlying basis
of the reversion concept. Presumably, unclaimed funds would revert to the
defendant on the theory that defendant’s money remains its own unless and
until it has been awarded as damages to and claimed by the plaintiff. The
legal inertia, in other words, is presumed to be in favor of the status quo
until both of these events take place. Of course, advocates of cy pres may
respond that when funds awarded as the result of litigation are unclaimed,
the money is no longer the defendant’s; rather, it has been judicially
determined to be damages for illegal behavior. But under the nation’s
private rights model of adjudication,125 damage awards are not made “in
telemarketers).
120. McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (concerning RICO
suit against tobacco companies for misrepresenting the harmfulness of light cigarettes).
121. See infra Part IV.
122. 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
123. Id. at 481–82. Though acknowledging the Supreme Court’s recognition of the possibility
of reversion to defendants, the court in Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 843 F. Supp. 491, 496,
499 (W.D. Ark. 1994), rejected that alternative under the facts of that case.
124. Shepherd, supra note 76, at 456.
125. For a detailed discussion of the private rights adjudicatory model, see MARTIN H. REDISH,
THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 90–103 (1991).
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the air.” Instead, they are awarded to a specific plaintiff, who has
presumably brought suit to vindicate his substantive right which the
defendant has allegedly violated.126 Until that plaintiff recovers the funds,
this argument proceeds, if only due to legal inertia the money remains the
property of the defendant. To be sure, it may trouble us that a defendant
who has been judicially determined to have violated the law gets to retain
money that rightly should have been transferred to its victims. But in light
of the underlying theoretical framework of the judicial process, reversion
to the defendant has at least an arguable foundation when the victim,
authorized to recover by governing substantive law, has for whatever
reason failed to claim his award.
The primary alternative to reversion of unclaimed funds to the
defendant, absent resort to cy pres, is escheat to the state.127 Under the
theory of this approach, once the money has been awarded in the form of
damages as part of a judgment, ownership of the money automatically
transfers to the plaintiffs. If the money goes unclaimed, the theory goes, it
is appropriately treated in the same manner as all unclaimed property is
usually treated: it escheats to the state.128 But once again, this mode of
disposition understandably leaves many unsatisfied, since we cannot be
assured that the award will necessarily be used by the state for socially
valuable purposes related to the subject matter of the suit.
The third alternative mode of disposition of unclaimed funds, absent
resort to cy pres, is an increase in the pro rata share of claiming plaintiffs.
But as commentators have noted, such an approach necessarily results in
an undeserved windfall for those plaintiffs, who have already been
compensated for the harm they have suffered.129
There is, of course, a fourth alternative that often seems to go
unnoticed: simply denying class certification on the grounds that such a
proceeding would be unmanageable. Where compensation of individual
victims in a manner contemplated by the underlying substantive law
through use of the class action device is infeasible, the inexorable
126. Of course, a plaintiff may have motivations for bringing suit that are grounded in the
public interest. Whatever plaintiff’s underlying motivation, however, she may not bring suit unless
she has suffered injury in fact caused by defendant’s actions which can be redressed by judicial
action. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563, 568 (1992).
127. See In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1984) (Flaum, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Traditionally, unclaimed property escheats to the
states.”). There is serious question as to whether unclaimed funds in suits brought under federal law
can escheat to the United States. Compare id. at 1255 (majority opinion) (finding “interim” escheat
to federal government is “impermanent” and therefore “raises no unconstitutional taking”; it will
remain available to pay late claimants who file), with id. at 1256 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that escheat to United States is impermissible, and as a practical matter
majority is authorizing escheat to United States).
128. See infra Part VI.
129. See generally Shepherd, supra note 76 (discussing the reversion of funds to defendants).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2

640

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

conclusion must be that resort to the class action procedure is improper. Its
use in such contexts would be the equivalent of insertion of a procedural
square peg in a substantive round hole. Those who wish to see widespread
corporate or governmental misbehavior punished, however, understandably
find this alternative unsatisfactory. Nevertheless, as nothing more than a
rule of procedure the class action device cannot rise above the substantive
law it is designed to enforce. If existing substantive remedies are deemed
inadequate as a means of enforcing the law’s behavioral prohibitions, the
task of altering the remedial framework is one for the authority that created
the substantive law in the first place. Resort to cy pres when existing
remedies cannot effectively be invoked by use of the class action device,
then, improperly distorts the remedial structure through use of a nakedly
procedural device.
Beyond putting defendant’s funds to valuable and worthwhile use, there
may also exist an additional dynamic at work in favor of the use of cy pres
in the class action context. Empirical research has shown that, whether
class attorneys are compensated by use of a percentage-of-the-fund method
or by a lodestar method (which measures fees on a calculation of the
amount of work the attorney put into the suit),130 the actual fee, on average,
generally amounts to one third of the fund—the size of which always
includes the funds distributed to a designated charity through cy pres.131 If
cy pres did not exist, the fund—and, of course, the size of the attorneys’
fee—might well be far smaller. This is especially true when the cy pres
relief is established by judicial order or class settlement ex ante. Thus, it is
surely reasonable to speculate that one of the primary effects, if not
purposes, of class action cy pres is to inflate the size of class attorneys’
fees. Whether intended or not, it surely has that effect.
Plaintiff class attorneys may have even stronger motivations for use of
cy pres relief. As already noted, in a number of situations individual claims
of absent class members will be too small, too difficult to prove, or too
expensive or difficult to distribute. Thus, in many cases it will not be all
that difficult for a certifying court to determine at the outset that it is highly
unlikely that resolution of the suit would result in significant transfer of
damages from defendant to its victims. If the only practical alternatives are
reversion to defendant or escheat to the state, a certifying court may well
be unwilling to certify the class. The availability of a possible cy pres
award to a worthy charity might well alter the situation sufficiently, in the

130. 4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 14:5–6 (4th ed
2002).
131. Id. § 14:6, at 551 (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage
method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
recovery.”); see also id. (asserting that the fee is measured on the basis of the size of the common
fund); infra Part IV.E.
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court’s mind, to justify certification.132
III. THE PATHOLOGIES OF CLASS ACTION CY PRES
A. The Unconstitutionality of Class Action Cy Pres
By criticizing judicially authorized donations to worthy charities, one
naturally risks subjecting oneself to the most unattractive labels of
“Grinch” or “Scrooge.” Nevertheless, there is little doubt that use of cy
pres in the class action context is improper as a matter of both democratic
theory and constitutional law. As an intrinsic matter, cy pres suffers from
three key constitutional flaws. First, the doctrine unconstitutionally
transforms the judicial process from a bilateral private rights adjudicatory
model into a trilateral process. Second, the practice violates separation of
powers because through the wholly improper mechanism of a purely
procedural device, the substantive law is effectively transformed from a
compensatory remedial structure to the equivalent of a civil fine. Finally,
from a litigant-oriented perspective, the very possibility of a cy pres award
threatens to undermine the due process rights of both defendants and
absent class plaintiffs. In addition to its own intrinsic failings, cy pres is
also deserving of criticism due to the instrumental role it plays in
disguising some of the serious problems of constitutional law and political
theory that plague the modern class action even absent use of cy pres. By
creating the illusion of compensation, cy pres effectively facilitates the
litigants’ ability to certify classes where all involved should know from the
outset that the plaintiff class exists in theory only.
In the discussions that follow, we explore each of these serious
constitutional concerns. Any one of them, standing alone, should provide a
sufficient basis for the total abandonment of the use of cy pres in the class
action context. When taken together, however, they underscore the serious
and fatal threats posed by the use of cy pres to the nation’s constitutional
and procedural foundation.
B. Trilateralization of the Bilateral Adjudicatory Process
When courts invoke cy pres in a class action, they introduce a non-party
into the litigation as a legally significant actor. In this manner, cy pres
transforms what begins as an adversary bilateral dispute (in accord with
constitutional dictates) into a less-than-fully-adversary trilateral process,
wholly unknown to the adjudicatory structure contemplated by Article III.
132. This will especially be true in the so-called “settlement class action” situation, where the
court is asked to certify on the condition that it accept a prearranged settlement agreed to by the
parties. See generally Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the
Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
545 (2006) (discussing constitutional difficulties resulting from the settlement class action device).
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It achieves this result by ordering or authorizing an award to an uninjured
private entity which had no involvement whatsoever in the legally relevant
events that gave rise to the suit.133 Awarding “damages” to an uninjured
third party effectively transforms the court’s function into a fundamentally
executive role, because no longer is the court functioning as a judicial
vehicle by which legal injuries suffered by those bringing suit are
remedied. Instead, the court presides over the administrative redistribution
of wealth for social good. As a result, the practice violates both the
constitutional separation of powers and the case-or-controversy
requirement of Article III.
Under Article III of the Constitution, the role of the federal courts is
confined to the resolution of live cases and controversies.134 Supreme
Court doctrine has long made clear that both the case-or-controversy
requirement and liberal democratic theory demand that actions of the
unaccountable judicial branch be confined to the redress of actual injuries
suffered by the party bringing suit.135 Thus, according to established
Supreme Court doctrine, the constitutional dictate of justiciability requires
findings of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability, and thus, the
plaintiff must have suffered concrete injury that is traceable to the
defendant’s unlawful behavior and that can be remedied by judicial
action.136 If any one of these three factors is not satisfied, the Court has
made clear, adjudication violates the case-or-controversy requirement. The
justification for these justiciability requirements is grounded in a proper
understanding of the unaccountable judiciary’s role in a constitutional
democracy. As the only unrepresentative branch of the federal government,
the judiciary’s sole justification for action is performance of its function as
adjudicator of live disputes and enforcer of legal rights.137 Judicially
authorized charitable donations that are neither recognized nor required by
controlling substantive law lie well beyond the scope of the
constitutionally ordained judicial function.
It may not at first be obvious that class action cy pres contravenes the
constitutional and political purposes served by the case-or-controversy
requirement. After all, cy pres relief involves neither issuance of advisory
opinions nor the judicial promulgation of controlling law untied to
resolution of a live dispute. Nevertheless, more careful examination reveals
the manner in which cy pres contravenes both the letter and spirit of Article
133. The court also leaves an injured party without compensation, as discussed infra Part IV.C.
134. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
135. For a detailed explanation of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, see generally
Redish & Kastanek, supra note 132.
136. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
137. See generally Redish & Kastanek, supra note 132 (discussing the textual and normative
groundings of the adversement requirement derived from Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement).
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III’s case-or-controversy requirement. Cy pres rests at the opposite pole
from impermissible judicial legislation: While judicial creation of
generally applicable law untied to resolution of a live controversy violates
Article III, so, too, does judicial alteration of the legal topography of a
specific situation, imposed by a court absent the resolution of a real dispute
between the litigants. Thus, even where a federal court makes no statement
about general legal precepts, its ordering of the transfer of money from one
private actor to another private actor whose rights have in no way been
violated inescapably contravenes Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement.
Compounding this constitutional violation is the inherently deceptive
manner in which it is achieved. What makes cy pres so deceptive is the
superficial appearance of the resolution of a live dispute: the plaintiff class
is presumably made up of those who claim to be victims and whose rights
are alleged to have been violated by the defendants. The constitutional
problem, however, is that requiring the defendant to donate to an uninjured
charitable recipient amounts to a remedial non-sequitur. The recipient has
sued no one—and with good reason, since its legal rights have presumably
been violated by no one. Ordering the transfer of defendants’ funds to the
charitable third party thus remedies no violation of anyone’s legally
protected rights. The charitable third party and the defendant are in no way
adverse to each other when the suit begins. Despite the superficial
resemblance of the cy pres litigation to a live case or controversy, a cy pres
award fails to satisfy any of the foundational requirements of Article III.
The fact that the amount paid to the charitable recipient equals a portion of
the harm suffered by the plaintiff class members as a result of defendants’
illegal actions is irrelevant for Article III purposes. Damages are not
determined in the air; unless they are imposed as a means of redressing a
legally recognized injury, they do not satisfy the justiciability requirements
imposed by Article III.
While this constitutional analysis appears to be indisputable in cases in
which the class action court coercively orders payment of cy pres relief to a
charitable recipient unrelated to the litigation, it might be argued that it is
irrelevant when cy pres relief is included as part of a class action settlement
that has been voluntarily agreed to by the parties. When cy pres relief is
voluntarily imposed by the parties themselves, the argument proceeds, it is
not properly attributable to the class action court and therefore Article III’s
requirements are not implicated. Pursuant to this argument, the parties may
voluntarily enter into a private contractual agreement in which plaintiff
agrees to drop her suit, with prejudice, in consideration for defendant’s
donation to the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, or any other recognized
charity.
This argument may well have force in non-class action litigation: it is
difficult to see how Article III would be in any way implicated by such a
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settlement agreement as long as the court is in no way involved in its
administration, since under these circumstances presumably the parties
may voluntarily enter into virtually any agreement they wish as a means of
resolving their private dispute. The resolution of a class action by means of
settlement, however, represents a wholly different situation. Unlike the
settlement of a non-class proceeding, settlement of a class action requires
court approval, following the conduct of a fairness hearing.138 Thus, the
federal judiciary is necessarily and substantially involved in every class
settlement. Moreover, no defendant would be placed in the position of
having to settle a class–wide proceeding—often thereby avoiding having to
“bet” its company139—unless the federal court has, either prior to or at the
time of settlement, certified the individual plaintiff’s suit as a class. Thus, a
defendant may be willing to accept the idea of cy pres relief as part of a
settlement only because of its awareness that such a form of relief is likely
to be employed by a class court in imposing coercive relief following
adjudication. It is therefore impossible to view use of cy pres in the course
of class settlements as untied to the federal courts’ exercise of the judicial
power.140
C. Transformation of the Underlying Substantive Law
Another pathological consequence of the trilateralization of the bilateral
adversary process caused by cy pres is the illegitimate transformation of
the underlying substantive law from a compensatory framework into the
practical equivalent of a civil fine. It must be remembered that a class
action suit does not “arise under” Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rather, it arises under the substantive law being enforced; Rule
23 merely facilitates that enforcement procedurally. As a matter of both
constitutional separation of powers and the terms of the Rules Enabling
Act,141 a court may not employ a rule of procedure to alter the essence of
the underlying substantive right being enforced. It is therefore
constitutionally inappropriate for a court, under the guise of the class
action procedure, to alter the underlying structure of the substantive law
that the class procedure is intended to enforce.
Substantive laws necessarily contain two elements: a behavioral
proscription and an enforcement mechanism.142 The proscription regulates
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
139. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995).
140. On the relevance of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement to class action
settlements, see generally Redish & Kastanek, supra note 132 (providing textual, doctrinal, and
theoretical analysis of the adverseness requirement of Article III). Because one of the authors has
previously developed the framework for analyzing the adverseness requirement, this Article only
reviews the elements necessary to address the pathologies of cy pres.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (prohibiting a rule from abridging, enlarging, or modifying a
substantive right).
142. Redish, supra note 74, at 75.
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an actor’s primary behavior, while the enforcement mechanism provides
either consequences for violating the proscription or some directly coercive
means of enforcing that proscription. The enforcement mechanism may
compensate a party injured by the actor’s wrongdoing or provide for
punitive remedies such as treble damages or criminal or administrative
penalties.143 It is therefore understandable that the specific remedial
choices made by the law-giver will often be politically controversial.
Alteration of that remedial choice, then, may not be made under the guise
of a rule of procedure without seriously risking the deception of the
electorate.
In addition to its serious systemic threat, use of cy pres also threatens
the absent individual claimants’ right to due process by judicially revoking
their substantive right to compensatory relief. Lawmakers often enact laws
that enforce their substantive directives by means of a compensatory
remedial model, under which victims are provided a private right of action
against the wrongdoer to make them whole after they have suffered a legal
wrong. By seeking to enforce her private right, an individual may also
incidentally further the public interest, but the right remains fundamentally
the individual’s.144 In their pristine substantive form, these rights have been
invested by the lawmaking authority (legislature, common law court, or
Constitution) in the individual victim. The class action procedure
established by Rule 23 allows the aggregation of these individual
substantive claims for purposes of procedural convenience; it does not (and
legally could not) transform the nature of the substantive law’s remedial
framework from a compensatory model into a civil fine. In a democracy, if
such a dramatic alteration in controlling substantive law is to be made, it
must be through the democratically authorized and monitored legislative
process.
It is true that cy pres relief is not formally the equivalent of a civil fine.
Whereas a civil fine is normally paid to the state, pursuant to cy pres the
143. Id. This punitive remedy may be additional civil penalties beyond compensation, or
criminal sanctions.
144. Id. at 86.
It surely does not follow, however, that federal adjudication is incapable
of advancing social, economic, or political interests that extend well
beyond the personal interest of the individual litigant. It means, simply,
that whatever impact federal adjudication may have on the public
interest must come as an incident to the assertion and adjudication of
narrower, personal interests.
Id.; see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669, 669 (1986) (“Probably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants to
enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of
public enforcement agencies.”).
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court transfers defendants’ money to a private charitable entity not directly
involved in the particular litigation. Moreover, whereas the amount of a
civil fine can be determined in a variety of ways, cy pres relief normally
approximates the amount of unclaimed damages suffered by the victim
class. Yet in its contrast to the classic compensatory remedial model, cy
pres is strikingly similar to the generic civil fine. Unlike a compensatory
model, both the civil fine and cy pres coercively transfer the defendant’s
money not as a form of compensation for injuries suffered but as a form of
punishment. The fact that one transfers it to an uninjured private third party
while the other transfers it to the state in no way alters the fundamental
difference separating both procedures from a remedial model requiring
victim compensation. Most important is the fact that both forms of remedy
differ dramatically from the victim compensation expressly dictated in the
substantive law being enforced in the class proceeding. Thus, the class
action device may no more legitimately transform a substantively dictated
compensatory model into cy pres relief than it may transform it into a civil
fine.145
It could conceivably be responded that, rather than transform the
remedial element of the underlying substantive law into a civil fine, cy pres
is instead properly viewed as relevant solely to the traditional question of
how to dispose of unclaimed property. By viewing cy pres through the lens
of unclaimed property disposition, it is arguably possible to divorce the
question of cy pres relief from the underlying substantive law being
enforced in the class proceeding. If, on the other hand, one were to
consider the question more holistically as one of how to enforce that
underlying substantive law through resort to the class action device, then
how a federal court treats the unclaimed property issue may well have
significant legal implications extending far beyond the procedural context.
Whether the disposition of unclaimed funds is, as a general matter, to
be deemed part and parcel of the “substantive” law is usually answered in
the negative. Instead, courts traditionally consider the disposition of
unclaimed property to a present legal issue wholly distinct from the
substantive law enforced in the suit that gave rise to the unclaimed award
in the first place. In Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Inc.,146 for example, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit treated the issue purely as a matter of
the federal court’s inherent equitable discretion, ignoring the possibility
145. One might argue that in a case in which the underlying substantive law authorizes
punitive damages, resort to a procedure resembling a civil fine is not problematic, since the purpose
of such damages is to punish, not to compensate. However, there remain fundamental differences
between the two remedial forms. Punitive damages are awarded as relief ancillary to the provision
of victim compensation. They are a substantively authorized windfall to those who have been
injured. In contrast, a civil fine (much like cy pres relief) is wholly divorced from the victim
compensation so central to the underlying law.
146. 880 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989).
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that Texas escheat law applied.147 Like the Fifth Circuit, “other federal
courts have treated the issue of the disposition of unclaimed funds in class
actions as a matter of judicial administration, committed to the discretion
of the district court under Rule 23 and unconstrained by state law.”148 On
one level, it is tempting to accept this conclusion. After all, one might
reasonably expect that cy pres would usually be employed in the class
action context only after all claimants have been given a reasonable
opportunity to file claims into the post-judgment award or settlement
fund.149 At that point, one might argue, the remainder of the fund can
reasonably be characterized as the unclaimed property of the remaining
unknown claimants. How one disposes of such property, it could be further
argued, is not an issue implicating the underlying substantive law, but
rather one purely of judicial administration. More careful examination,
however, reveals that to view class action cy pres as merely a matter of the
substantively neutral administration of unclaimed property grossly and
misleadingly oversimplifies the relevant legal dynamics. To the contrary,
invocation of cy pres in the class action context alters substantially the
DNA of the underlying substantive law, without any legitimate substantive
authorization for making such a change.
To disingenuously conceptualize the radical non-compensatory damage
disposition methods as nothing more than the trans–substantive disposal of
unclaimed property is to place form over substance. The likely difficulties
in distribution of relief will almost always be easily recognizable by both
court and litigants at the class proceeding’s certification stage.150 Thus,
when the federal court chooses to certify the class, it must be presumed to
be aware that a significant portion of the awarded funds cannot feasibly be
distributed in a compensatory manner, as designated by the substantive law
being enforced.151 From the outset, however, the potential availability of cy
147. Id. at 811.
148. In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig. (No. II), MDL No. 1206, 2007 WL 4377835, at *14 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 12, 2007) (citing Powell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 119 F.3d 703, 706–07 (8th Cir. 1997);
Six Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1307 (9th Cir. 1990); Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 739 F.2d 730, 737 (2d Cir. 1984).
149. This is not always the case, however. In a number of cases, cy pres has been invoked in an
ex ante matter, before claimants have had an opportunity to file a claim. See infra Part IV.C.
150. Certain courts, recognizing these dangers, have refused certification. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 232 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Given that any residue would
be distributed to the class’s benefit on the basis of cy pres principles rather than returned to
defendants, defendants would still be paying the inflated total estimated amount of damages arrived
at under the first step of the fluid recovery analysis.”); see also In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples
Antitrust Litig., No. 1:04-md-1628 (RMB), 2008 WL 5661873, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008)
(rejecting certification because fluid class recovery plan would not assure compensation to injured
class).
151. Cf. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting statistical
sampling method of computing damages in asbestos class action under Erie doctrine because Texas,
which supplied the underlying cause of action, “has made its policy choices in defining the duty
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pres makes the class concept viable. It is clear, then, that class action cy
pres is designed for the very purpose of enabling the class action procedure
in a situation in which otherwise the substantive law would have the effect
of preventing it. Therefore when the court certifies the class it must be
deemed to be knowingly employing Rule 23 as a means to radically alter
the compensatory remedial model invariably embodied in the underlying
substantive law being enforced in the class proceeding. This is simply too
big a dog for the small tail of Rule 23 to wag.
It is important to note that this concern applies far beyond the
traditional issues surrounding choice of law when state law and federal
adjudication overlap. The Rules Enabling Act, under which the Federal
Rules are promulgated, explicitly provides that a rule may “not abridge,
enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Because even when the
underlying right is federally created, the enforcement mechanism is
necessarily an important element of the substantive right; use of Rule 23 to
authorize radical modification in the mode of penalization or enforcement
is itself a violation of the Enabling Act’s restriction.
No more helpful to the argument that judicial discretion controls under
Rule 23 would be a general appeal to a court’s inherent equitable
discretion.152 Initially, it is wholly anachronistic to seek to justify the
radically new practices of class action cy pres on the basis of an appeal to
historically authorized equity practice.153 More importantly, Rule 23
purports to vest in the class action court no special equitable authority to
fashion final relief in any manner it deems appropriate, regardless of the
underlying substantive law’s directives—nor could it, without blatantly
violating the limits imposed by the Rules Enabling Act. The nature of the
remedy for violation of substantive law is as substantive as the primary
behavioral prohibition itself. As already noted, it involves issues of social,
moral and economic policy that go well beyond the interests of the
judiciary. Equity cannot exceed the limits of either the Rules Enabling Act
or the Constitution, and for a court to rely on the support of the class action
rule to justify its replacement of substantively sanctioned relief is to ignore
both.

owed by manufacturers and suppliers of products to consumers”).
152. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(“Faced with the more closely analogous problem of how to dispose of unclaimed portions of
settlement funds, courts have the power and the responsibility to exercise equitable discretion to
achieve substantial justice in the distribution of the funds.”). For an example of commentators citing
the judiciary’s equitable powers as a basis for using cy pres, see 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note
130, § 10:16 (“[I]t has been recognized that this determination falls within the general equity
powers of the court and that defendants lack standing to contest this issue once they have already
been found liable for the aggregate damages.”).
153. Recall that the doctrine of cy pres developed not in the class action context, but in the law
of trusts. See supra Part II.A.
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D. Cy Pres and the Facilitation of Class Action Pathology154
Cy pres’ effective transformation of class–wide compensatory damages
into the equivalent of a civil fine is indicative not merely of the practice’s
intrinsic invalidity. It is also problematic in an instrumental sense because,
when used in this manner, cy pres helps to conceal the most invidious of
the modern class action’s pathologies: the “faux” class action.155 The term
refers to suits brought as class actions where the individual damages are,
on the whole, so minimal and the barriers to filing claims so high that as a
practical matter the function of the suit as a means of compensating injured
victims is all but completely undermined. In these suits, it is the class
attorneys, who presumably have suffered no injury at the hands of the
defendant, who are the ones financially rewarded for bringing the
wrongdoer to justice. In effect, the faux class action transforms a
compensatory class into a qui tam action, in which an uninjured party is
incentivized to bring suit by receiving a portion of the damages for its
successful prosecution. In this manner, the faux class action transforms the
DNA of the substantive remedial model from a compensatory framework
to what can be called a “bounty hunter” framework.156
Cy pres facilitates this wholly improper remedial transformation by
creating the illusion of compensation, thereby diluting or obscuring the
starkly illegitimate nature of the bounty hunter remedial model. By forcing
class defendants to pay at least a portion of the class–wide relief to a
sympathetic charity having some loose connection to the subject matter of
the suit, cy pres relief makes the attorneys’ fees seem less the central goal
of the proceeding and more the ancillary facilitator of victim
compensation. But the charity was not a victim; its legal rights were not
violated, nor was the suit filed for the purpose of their vindication. Thus,
any payment it receives serves no compensatory purpose. In effect, by
means of cy pres relief, one procedural illusion is created to disguise
another: the illusion of victim compensation, designed to prevent the
realization that a real class of plaintiffs seeking and expecting
compensation, in reality does not exist.
Cy pres has also facilitated the other ominous class action pathology:
the so-called settlement class action. Under this procedure, the parties
agree to a settlement prior to seeking certification, and seek certification
solely on the condition that the court approve the settlement.157 Under no
circumstances will the suits be litigated; the federal courts’ authority is
exercised over a case in which the parties are in full agreement from the
154. For an explanation of the concept of class action “pathology,” see supra Part I.
155. For detailed analysis and explanation of the faux class action, see Redish, supra note 1, at
21–85.
156. Id. at 25–26.
157. For a detailed analysis and critique of the settlement class action, see generally Redish &
Kastanek, supra note 132.
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outset of the suit. The certification decision is made without the benefit of
the adversary process. As our empirical research demonstrates,158 the use
of cy pres has grown substantially in recent years, and understandably so. It
should not be difficult to conclude that the availability of cy pres makes the
certification of a settlement class far simpler, since it assures the certifying
court that defendants will be made to pay, and that that money will be put
to good use.
Perhaps the strongest intuitive basis on which to support cy pres relief
is the deterrent effect this form of relief is assumed to have on unlawful
behavior. Absent resort to cy pres, the argument proceeds, wrongdoers
would never be forced to pay for the harm they have caused in those
situations in which large numbers of individual victims cannot feasibly be
found or compensated. As a result, advocates of cy pres might well argue,
there would exist no civil mechanism by which to deter similar unlawful
behavior—either by the same or other wrongdoers—in the future. But
whatever one thinks about this argument purely as a normative matter, it is
clear that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure—even a rule as important as
the one authorizing class actions—is a legally inappropriate device through
which to solve the problem. In a democracy, if the existing remedial model
provided for in the governing substantive law has proven unsatisfactory,
any alterations must come from the same government organs that
promulgated the substantive law in the first place.
E. Cy Pres and the Due Process Rights of Absent Class Members
In addition to the serious constitutional and political problems which
we have already described, use of cy pres relief in class actions also gives
rise to fatal violations of procedural due process. By disincentivizing class
attorneys from vigorously pursuing individualized compensation for absent
class members, cy pres threatens the due process rights of those class
members. In this manner, the practice unconstitutionally undermines the
due process obligation of those representing absent class members to
vigorously advocate on their behalf and defend their legal rights.159 It
brings about this constitutionally troubling result by ensuring that the size
of the settlement or award fund will remain constant, regardless of the
likelihood or actuality of compensating injured victims. Because as a
practical matter the size of attorneys’ fees will be tied, directly or
indirectly, to the size of the class–wide award,160 where the size of that
award included the cy pres relief the class attorneys’ financial interest will
be wholly divorced from their efforts to compensate individual class
members. This does not necessarily mean that in every case in which cy
158. See infra Part IV.
159. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1940); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (requiring
adequacy of representation).
160. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
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pres is awarded, class attorneys will fail to fashion effective mechanisms of
class relief. But due process may be violated even in situations in which no
prejudice is actually demonstrated. It is sufficient, in order to establish a
violation of due process, to establish the existence of a temptation to the
reasonable person to ignore her constitutionally dictated responsibilities to
the litigants.161 There can be little doubt that by assuring class attorneys of
the same pay whether absent class members receive compensation or not,
use of cy pres threatens to undermine their constitutionally imposed
obligations.
The most likely response to the due process attack on cy pres is that the
constitutional dangers to which we point are by no means confined to the
use of cy pres. Indeed, any measure of class attorneys’ fees that does not
restrict those fees to a percentage of the amount actually claimed, rather
than the amount awarded class wide,162 would seem to give rise to the very
same danger. But the fact that other methodologies—for example, escheat
to the state of unclaimed funds or increase in the size of amounts paid to
those class members who do file claims—give rise to the same
constitutional problems in no way avoids the fatal constitutional flaw in cy
pres. In any event, because, as previously noted, cy pres provides the
illusion of compensation by awarding class funds to a charity connected—
if only loosely—to the general subject matter of the law suit, its availability
likely makes class certification a far more attractive prospect than if cy pres
were unavailable. No other method of treating unclaimed class–wide funds
creates this illusion. In this manner, cy pres provides a uniquely effective
shield for the constitutional pathologies of the class action.
One might also respond to the due process critique that the options
available to class attorneys to improve the administration of class
compensation are in reality quite limited, so as a practical matter absent
class members are not likely to suffer substantially due to cy pres’s
availability. It is difficult to know whether this will be true in the
individual case, but the fact remains that class attorney incentives to find
ways to assist class members will inevitably be impacted by the extent to
which their own compensation is tied to the amounts actually recovered.
Indeed, it is this very form of incentivization that lies at the heart of the
contingent fee process. Thus, rather than make the wholly unsupported ex
ante assumption that attorney ingenuity will be of no help in fostering class
member recovery in the individual case, it makes more sense to employ a
measure of class relief that encourages, rather than discourages, an
attorney’s creative use of such ingenuity.

161. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259–61 (2009) (discussing Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
162. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d. 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008).
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IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CY PRES AWARDS IN FEDERAL
CLASS ACTION CASES
To further study the use and possible consequences of class action cy
pres awards, we examined a set of federal class action cases with such
awards. A series of searches conducted using Westlaw, LEXIS, JSTOR,
and Google revealed 120 federal class action cases from 1974 through
2008 where the court either included a cy pres award as part of a judgment
or approved a cy pres distribution as part of a settlement.163 The compiled
dataset of 120 cases provides a factual backdrop for some of the legal and
pathology concerns discussed in earlier parts of this Article.
The dataset informs several important questions related to class action
cy pres awards, including:
• What is the prevalence of class action cy pres awards
from their first use in 1974 through 2008?
• To what extent are cy pres awards associated with
settlement class and faux class actions?
• How often are cy pres awards granted ex ante, i.e.,
before absent class members have the opportunity to
make claims?
• How large are cy pres awards in class actions?
• What impact might class action cy pres awards have
on the amount of fees granted to plaintiffs’ attorneys?

163. The dataset was developed from searches of Westlaw, LEXIS, JSTOR, and Google.
Initially, in June 2008, the Westlaw ALLFEDS database was searched using the terms “class
action!” and “cy pres.” This search was then supplemented in November and December 2008 using
the LEXIS, JSTOR, and Google search functions. The LEXIS “Federal & State Cases, Combined”
database was searched for “class action” AND (“cy pres” OR “fluid class recovery” OR “fluid
recovery” OR “leftover award” OR “remaining award” OR “remainder award”). The same search
string was used in both JSTOR’s Basic Search and in Google. Combined, these searches resulted in
657 cases. In many of these cases, the court mentioned cy pres only incidentally, or rejected a cy
pres award. For purposes of this Article, only the cases where the court granted a cy pres award to a
third party charity as part of a judgment on the merits or where the court approved a settlement
agreement that included a cy pres distribution to a third party charity were included. The remaining
120 cases in the dataset are only in federal courts and are not duplicative. Quantitative legal
research from databases such as Westlaw and LEXIS may have inherent selection biases because
they do not include every case, nor are the available cases randomly selected. The same is true of
JSTOR and other publicly available mentions of cy pres awards. Therefore, caution must be
exercised if extrapolating results to the broader population of cy pres cases.
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A. The Prevalence of Class Action Cy Pres Awards
In light of the serious constitutional concerns raised about use of class
action cy pres, it is important to understand the trend in the growth of such
awards over time. Over the last three decades, the number of class action
cy pres awards in the dataset has increased, especially after 2000 (Figure
1).164
From 1974 through 2000, federal courts granted or approved cy pres
awards to third party charities in thirty class actions, or an average of
approximately once per year. Since 2001, federal courts granted or
approved cy pres awards in sixty-five class actions, or an average of
roughly eight per year. Hence, the use of class action cy pres awards by
federal courts has increased since the 1980s and has accelerated sharply
after 2000.
Figure 1

B. Cy Pres Awards in Settlement Class and Faux Class Actions
As mentioned earlier, cy pres awards may be used by parties to conceal
problematic types of class actions, such as settlement class actions165 and
164. The following analysis is based on ninety-five cases since an explicit cy pres award date
for every case was not available.
165. When a court certifies a settlement class action, it violates the Article III requirement that
it only adjudicate cases or controversies. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note 132, at 582. When the
parties submit a settlement class action to the court, the parties agree on the desired outcome, and
lack the requisite adverseness. Id. at 563. The only benefit of filtering the settlement through the
court is to foreclose the rights of absent plaintiffs.
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faux class actions,166 where the class action procedure is used primarily for
the benefit of participants in the process other than the absent claimants.167
Absent the availability of cy pres awards, it is at least possible these cases
would not have proceeded past the certification stage. One important
question, then, is the extent to which the observed increase in the use of cy
pres awards is associated with a corresponding increase in the use of
settlement class actions over time. As can be seen in Figure 2, the percent
of class actions in the dataset that were certified for the purposes of
settlement has increased both over time and relative to the cases that have
settled post-certification or been adjudicated on the merits.168
Figure 2

166. Faux class actions are class action suits where the damages are too small to incentivize an
individual plaintiff to pursue the available funds. For the purposes of this analysis, a faux class
action was defined as one where the mean award per plaintiff is likely to be less than $100. In cases
where calculations were necessary to determine whether the case was a faux class action, the mean
award per plaintiff was calculated based on the total award and the number of anticipated plaintiffs
in the class.
167. Ironically, the University of Chicago Law Review Comment originally advocated the use
of cy pres in class actions in order to avoid making class actions an instrument that benefited only
lawyers. Shepherd, supra note 76, at 449.
168. There are also six cases where it was not possible to tell from the information available
whether the cy pres award was part of a case that was adjudicated on the merits, that settled postcertification, or that was a settlement class action (“Unclear Class Action Disposition” in Figure 2).
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Prior to 2001, eight of the cases were settlement class actions. Over the
same time period, seventeen cases were either decided by the courts on the
merits or were settled post-certification and five cases did not have
sufficient information to determine whether the case was adjudicated on
the merits, was settled post-certification, or was a settlement class action.
Thus, eight out of thirty (or 26.7%) cases were clearly settlement class
actions and most of the eight cases did not appear until the end of the time
period. After 2000, thirty-four cases were clearly settlement class actions,
thirty cases were adjudicated or settled post-certification, and one case did
not provide sufficient information to determine whether the case was
adjudicated on the merits, was settled post-certification, or was a
settlement class action. The percent of settlement class actions after 2000
increased to thirty-four out of sixty-five cases (52.3%). Since 2000, then,
over half of the class action cy pres awards occurred in settlement class
actions.
A second related question is the extent to which the increase in the use
of cy pres awards is associated with an increase in faux class actions over
time. Much like settlement class actions, cy pres awards also have a
positive relationship with faux class actions (Figure 3).
Figure 3

Before 2001, eleven of thirty cases (or 36.7%) were faux class actions.
Likewise, after 2000, twenty-four out of sixty-five cases (or 36.9%) were
faux class actions. Generally, over a third of class action cy pres awards are
associated with faux class actions.
Combining the results from Figures 2 and 3, it is clear that cy pres
awards have a positive and increasing relationship with both settlement and
faux class actions (Figure 4).
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Figure 4

Prior to 2001, fourteen of thirty cases (or 46.7%) were settlement or
faux class actions but after 2000, forty-two of sixty-five cases (or 64.6%)
were such cases. Further, over the entire time period, twenty-one cases
were both settlement and faux class actions. Sixteen of these cases
occurred after 2000. As such, settlement class and faux class actions went
from representing less than half of the class actions with cy pres awards
before 2001 to about two-thirds after 2000. Thus, from 1974 to 2008 not
only is there an increasing number of class actions with cy pres awards in
the dataset, but the increase is associated with both settlement and faux
class actions. Specifically, based on the data available, since 2000 over half
of the class action cy pres awards occurred in settlement class actions, over
one-third of class action cy pres awards occurred in faux class actions, and
approximately two-thirds of class action cy pres awards occurred in either
settlement or faux class actions.
C. Ex Ante Cy Pres Awards
In some instances, courts also name the charitable recipient of the cy
pres award in anticipation of a remainder, allocating an award amount up
front, rather than waiting to see what funds remain unclaimed. That courts
occasionally designate cy pres awards ex ante before attempting to
compensate absent members, illustrates the transformative nature of cy
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pres awards.169 Ignoring temporarily the pathologies of cy pres, at least one
could consider a court to be acting “reasonably ancillary” to resolving a
dispute when it makes a cy pres award out of unclaimed funds after giving
absent class members notice of the fund and a chance to make a claim.170
The presence of ex ante awards indicates that the court recognizes from the
outset that overwhelmingly, plaintiffs will not receive compensation from
the suit and is thus not acting in a manner that is “reasonably ancillary” to
the dispute. As Figure 5 shows, federal courts awarded cy pres ex ante171
thirty times out of 120 cases (or in 25% of the cases).
Figure 5
Ex Ante Cy Pres Awards
by Class Action Disposition
Adjudicated Class Action
Post-Certification Settled Class Action
Settlement Class Action
Unclear Class Action Disposition
Total Ex Ante Cy Pres Awards

Number of Cases
2
13
14
1
30

Of those thirty ex ante cy pres awards, two were given as part of a
court-ordered award.172 Of the cases with ex ante cy pres awards that
settled, thirteen were from post-certification settlements, fourteen were
from settlement class actions, and one had an unclear disposition based on
the available information.
The use of ex ante cy pres awards underscores the federal judiciary’s
reliance on cy pres to transform the underlying substantive law’s
compensatory remedial model into a wholly distinct civil fine model. By
distributing the funds to charities before even providing absent class
members with an opportunity to redeem their individual claims from a
damage or settlement fund, the courts are making clear that the award is
not really intended to compensate the plaintiffs, but solely to punish the
defendant. Indeed, this has occurred in a noticeable number of cases. In a
169. See supra Part III.B.
170. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 21–22 (1994)
(holding that a court “may make such disposition of the whole case as justice may require,”
including the use of any judicial practice “reasonably ancillary to the primary, dispute-deciding
function of the federal courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. “Ex ante,” for purposes of this analysis, is defined as a cy pres award that was designated
as a part of a settlement agreement or judgment where: (1) an amount and at least one charity was
named as a recipient of part of the fund from the outset and the charity’s receipt of the award was
not contingent on there being remaining/unclaimed funds in the settlement fund, or (2) the entire
award was given to at least one named charity with no attempt to compensate the absent class
members.
172. Note that in the dataset of 120 cases, only thirteen were adjudicated.
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quarter of cy pres class actions, the amount and recipient of the cy pres
award were determined prior to giving absent class members the
opportunity to make claims on the awarded class–wide fund.
Figure 6173
Class Action Cy Pres Awards as a Percent of Total Compensatory
Damages
Total Compensatory
Damages

Class Action Cy
Pres Awards

Cy Pres as a Percent of
Compensatory
Damages(Paired)

Average

$51,778,958

$5,847,866

30.8%

Median

$11,300,000

$243,000

11.5%

Maximum

$445,078,000

$75,700,000

100.0%

Minimum

$1,342

$342

0.1%

$91,706,915

$14,497,677

35.9%

47

47

47

St. Dev.
Cases

D. The Magnitude of Class Action Cy Pres Awards
Since the data show cy pres award usage is increasing, especially in
settlement class and faux class actions, the next reasonable inquiry is into
the size and proportions of class action cy pres awards. Figure 6 shows the
dollar amounts of class action cy pres awards as well as these awards’
relationships to total compensatory damages.174
In the forty-seven cases where compensatory damage, attorneys’ fee,
and cy pres award amounts were separately identifiable, the average cy
pres award was $5.8 million and reached as high as $75.7 million. Further,
cy pres awards averaged 30.8% of the total compensatory damages
awarded and ranged from 0.1% to a 100.0%. Interestingly, there are ten
cases where the cy pres award was 75.0% or more of the total
compensatory damages. All ten of these cases were faux class actions with
ex ante cy pres awards and six were also settlement class actions. As such,
cy pres awards generally make up a non-trivial portion of total
173. The variable “Cy Pres as a Percent of Compensatory Damages (Paired),” was derived
from a distribution that included each case’s cy pres award as a percent of total compensatory
damages. Thus, the percentages shown cannot be calculated from the information in Figure 6.
174. For purposes of this analysis, total compensatory damages include all cy pres awards but
specifically exclude attorneys’ fees and other costs.
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compensatory damages awarded, and in some cases comprise the entire
compensatory award.
E. The Impact of Class Action Cy Pres Awards on Attorneys’ Fees
Faux and settlement class actions with cy pres awards are problematic if
they misuse class actions for the benefit of attorneys rather than for the
plaintiffs. One potential source for such abuse may be evident when
considering attorneys’ fees that are determined by reference to these nontrivial cy pres awards.175
Generally, in class actions, attorneys’ fees equal approximately one
third of the total fund.176 As Figure 7 shows, in the sixty-three cases177
where it was possible to separately determine both the total recovery and
the attorneys’ fees, the attorneys’ fees averaged 35.9% of the total
recovery, but ranged from as little as 0.4% to as much as 98.3%. The
average attorneys’ fee awarded was $14.1 million.

175. 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 130, § 14:6, at 546–47. Newberg explains the reasoning
behind awarding compensation off the entire fund as follows:
The common fund doctrine allows a court to distribute attorney’s fees
from the common fund that is created for the satisfaction of class
members’ claims when a class action reaches settlement or judgment.
The doctrine is grounded in the principles of quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment, in two senses. First, the doctrine prevents unjust enrichment
of absent members of the class at the expense of the attorneys. It is
meant to compensate the attorneys in proportion to the benefit they have
obtained for the entire class (the fund), not just the representative
members with whom they have contracted.
Id.
176. Id. § 14:6, at 551 (“Empirical studies show that, regardless whether the percentage
method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of the
recovery.”).
177. The sets of cases in Figures 6 and 7 are not identical. However, there is some overlap
between the sets.
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Figure 7178
Attorneys’ Fees as a Percent of Total Recovery in Cy Pres Class Actions

Total Recovery

Attorneys’ Fees

Average

$100,200,592

$14,101,946

Attorneys’ Fees as a
Percent of Total
Recovery
(Paired)
35.9%

Median

$7,500,000

$1,088,787

30.0%

Maximum

$3,200,000,000

$464,000,000

98.3%

Minimum

$16,400

$10,000

0.4%

$408,803,092

$59,191,541

26.6%

63

63

63

St. Dev.
Cases

Although attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the total recovery in cy pres
class actions are similar to the percentage in class actions generally, the
primary concern in cy pres class actions is the absolute amount of money
awarded to the plaintiffs’ attorneys.179 Assuming that cy pres should not be
awarded in the class action context, since it will not compensate the
plaintiff classes, the absence of cy pres awards could possibly lead to a
decrease in the size of the total fund awarded.180 If the fund on which a
percent of attorneys’ fees is based decreases, then the actual amount of
attorneys’ fees will necessarily decrease as well. The percent, however,
may remain the same in these situations. Further, if a case might not have
been certified absent a cy pres award, then the plaintiffs’ attorneys likely
would not have received any fees for that case but for the availability of cy
pres awards.
As an example, given that the average cy pres award was $5.8 million
and accounted for 30.8% of total compensatory damages and given that the
average attorneys’ fees as a percent of total recovery was 35.9%, such
awards meaningfully increase attorneys’ compensation without directly, or
178. “Total Recovery” includes all monetary amounts awarded to the plaintiffs or cy pres
recipients. This includes the total fund with cy pres awards and attorneys’ fees. The variable
“Attorneys’ Fees as a Percent of Total Recovery (Paired)” was derived from a distribution that
included each case’s attorneys’ fees as a percent of total recovery. Thus, the percentages shown
cannot be calculated from the information in Figure 7.
179. See supra Part II.B.4.
180. Technically this should hold for any awards that do not directly compensate the plaintiff
class, not just cy pres awards.
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even indirectly, benefiting the plaintiff. Additionally, of the ten cases
where the cy pres amount was 75.0% or more of the total compensatory
damages, all of them are potentially questionable cases. This suggests that
cy pres awards could further increase attorneys’ compensation by allowing
additional class actions that may not have been certified otherwise to
continue.
Therefore, not only does the availability of cy pres awards have the
potential to increase the total available fund only as a punishment to the
defendant and legitimize cases where the class might not otherwise be
certified, but it can also increase the likelihood and absolute amount of
attorneys’ fees awarded.
F. Conclusions
The available data provide several key answers to the questions posed
in the beginning of this Part. First, the prevalence of class action cy pres
awards has increased steadily by decade since the 1980s and has
accelerated noticeably after 2000. Second, since 2000, the majority of class
action cy pres awards are associated with cases that were certified solely
for the purposes of settlement, over one-third of class action cy pres awards
are associated with faux class actions, and approximately two-thirds of
class action cy pres awards are associated with either settlement or faux
class actions. Third, in a quarter of cy pres class actions, the amount and
recipient of the cy pres award was determined ex ante, or prior to giving
absent class members the opportunity to make claims on the fund. Fourth,
the average cy pres award was $5.8 million and accounted on average for
30.8% of total compensatory damages. Finally, not only do cy pres awards
have the potential to increase the total available fund and legitimize cases
where the class might not otherwise be certified, but they can also increase
the likelihood and absolute amount of attorneys’ fees awarded without
directly, or even indirectly, benefiting the plaintiff.
V. FLUID CLASS RECOVERY AND CY PRES CONTRASTED
In contrast to cy pres, the fluid class recovery concept has had a most
difficult time in the courts. This is puzzling, since while both alternatives
have their problems, as a conceptual matter fluid class recovery represents
a far more arguably legitimate approach than does cy pres.
One commentator defined “fluid class recovery” as a “three-step
process: calculation of gross rather than individual damages, individual
recovery from a damage fund upon authentication of claims by class
members, and distribution of the remainder of the fund to the class as a
whole or to an entity that will benefit the class as a whole.”181 On occasion,
181. Gregory A. Hartman, Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 OR. L. REV.
225, 227 (1974).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 2

662

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

courts have treated cy pres and fluid class recovery as fungible concepts.182
For purposes of both separation of powers and due process critiques,
however, it is necessary to draw an important distinction between the two.
As the term has been most often used, cy pres refers to the designation of a
portion of unclaimed damage or settlement funds to a charitable use that is
in some way related to the subject of the suit. As employed here, fluid class
recovery applies to an effort—either in a class settlement or as part of a
class award—to approximate the injured class of consumers through the
provision of relief to future consumers. The assumption is that the class of
future users will likely substantially overlap with the injured class of past
consumers.
A classic illustration of this form of fluid class recovery came in the
California state class action, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.183 There a taxicab
customer brought a class action to recover excessive charges by the
defendant company for use of its taxicabs over a four-year period. The trial
court approved a settlement that, instead of paying past cab users, lowered
future fares for a specified period for the benefit of future riders. Since
individual claims by past taxicab users would obviously have been
infeasible, the only alternative to such fluid class recovery would have
been to allow the defendant to escape payment for its unlawful behavior.
In the federal courts, future approximation fluid class recovery has had
something of a checkered history. In the well-known case of Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin,184 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
overturned the district court’s use of fluid class recovery in a complex and
controversial antitrust suit brought by an odd-lot stock trader (i.e., transfers
involving less than a hundred shares) against the major odd-lot dealers on
the New York Stock Exchange. The class consisted of approximately six
million traders whose damages were relatively minimal (the named
plaintiff’s claim was for $70). Finding them, notifying them, and then
getting them to go the trouble of filing individual claims were all highly
unlikely.185 Hence the district court fashioned a scheme in which the
amount of a class–wide damage fund remaining after individual claims
were filed was “to be used for the benefit of all odd-lot traders by reducing
the odd-lot differential ‘in an amount determined reasonable by the court
until such time as the fund is depleted.’”186 A skeptical Second Circuit
stated that it was “at a loss to understand how this is to be done, but it is
182. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008); Democratic
Cent. Comm. of D.C. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n, 84 F.3d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (“In the context of class actions, the cy pres doctrine is referred to as ‘fluid
recovery.’”).
183. 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967).
184. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (Eisen III), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
185. Id. at 1010.
186. Id. at 1011 (quoting the district court opinion).
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suggested that it ‘might properly be done under SEC supervision or at least
with SEC approval’”—something that the court suspected was not legally
authorized.187 Continuing with its obvious skepticism, the Second Circuit
wrote: “All the difficulties of management are supposed to disappear once
the ‘fluid recovery’ procedure is adopted. The claims of the individual
members of the class become of little consequence.”188 The Eisen court
categorically rejected the district court’s fluid class recovery plan,
concluding that
Even if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any
such fantastic procedure, the courts would have to reject it as
an unconstitutional violation of the requirement of due
process of law. But as it now reads amended Rule 23
contemplates and provides for no such procedure.189
The court therefore held “the ‘fluid recovery’ concept and practice to be
illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the manageability problems of class
actions and wholly improper.”190
The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits relied on
Eisen to disallow fluid class recovery distribution methods in class
actions.191 However, perhaps because the Second Circuit’s sweeping
rejection of fluid class recovery was so lacking in anything even
approaching persuasive supporting reasoning, courts have on occasion
accepted the practice despite that court’s well-known refusal to recognize
it. For example, in Democratic Central Committee of the District of
Columbia v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,192 the
D.C. Circuit, in dictum, noted that the future price reduction version of
fluid class recovery “is ‘particularly effective for remedying overcharges
on items which are repeatedly purchased by the same individuals.’”193 The
court noted that “[s]tate courts, in particular California, have been more
hospitable to fluid recovery in class actions.”194
Even the Second Circuit itself subsequently authorized a form of fluid
class recovery. For example, in In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability
Litigation,195 although that court rejected—on the basis of Eisen—Judge
Weinstein’s establishment of a class assistance foundation to fund projects
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1017.
189. Id. at 1018.
190. Id.
191. Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 72 n.41 (4th Cir. 1977); Kline v. Coldwell,
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 233–34 (9th Cir. 1974).
192. 84 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
193. Id. at 455 (quoting State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 571 (1986)).
194. Id. at 455 n.2; see, e.g., State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 576 (1986).
195. 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987).
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and services that would benefit the entire class of servicemen allegedly
made ill by exposure to the defendants’ chemical defoliant in Vietnam, it
allowed use of a portion of the settlement fund “to provide programs for
the class as a whole.”196 Eisen was distinguishable, the court held, because
“the class that will benefit from the district court’s distribution plan is
essentially equivalent to the class that claims injury from Agent
Orange.”197 In contrast, “[i]n Eisen, the proposed recovery scheme would
primarily have benefitted not the class of persons who claimed injury from
prior odd-lot transactions but instead a class of persons who would engage
in such transactions in the future.”198 In effect, the court was saying that the
only thing wrong with the fluid class recovery scheme in Eisen was its
failure to have the future class adequately “mirror image” the injured class.
It was in no way rejecting the approach as an abstract matter. Similarly, in
the recent decision in In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust
Litigation,199 the Southern District of New York rejected a proposed fluid
class recovery scheme on the grounds that it was not clear that a future
price reduction would actually benefit the injured purchaser class.200 Thus,
despite Eisen’s sweeping categorical rejection of the practice, it is
conceivable that at least a disciplined form of future approximation fluid
class recovery could today be acceptable.
This disciplined effort to reflect in the group of future beneficiaries the
bulk of the class of injured victims arguably distinguishes this form of fluid
class recovery from the charitable award version of cy pres. The latter
unconstitutionally triangulates the bilateral adjudicatory process
contemplated in Article III by insertion of a non-injured party, effectively
transforms the DNA of the underlying substantive law by improper means,
and threatens to undermine the due process rights of absent class members
by externalizing their interests. In contrast, the former appears to represent
a creative effort to compensate the class of victims which would otherwise
be impossible. The problem for future approximation fluid class recovery,
of course, is that the devil is in the details. It will often be difficult to say
with any assurance that the two are likely to basically match up. Absent
such assurance, the practice suffers from virtually all of the defects and
pathologies that afflict cy pres.
VI. HOW TO TREAT UNCLAIMED FUNDS
Since we have rejected use of cy pres as a means of disposing of
unclaimed class funds, we are left with the question of exactly what to do
with those funds. In many cases, this question should have been answered
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.
Id.
No. 1:04-md-1628 (RMB), 2008 WL 5661873 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2008).
Id. at *6–7.
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at the start of the case, rather than at its close. We conclude that the proper
way to deal with a situation in which there remain significant unclaimed
funds in a class action is to avoid the situation in the first place, by simply
not certifying the class. A federal court asked to certify a class suit should
always demand that the party (or, assuming settlement class actions
continue to exist, “parties”) seeking certification establish that meaningful
relief will be provided to the large majority of the class members.
Even if the federal courts, however, follow this front-loaded
recommendation, cases will no doubt arise in which a portion of the award
or settlement fund will remain unclaimed—albeit in far smaller amounts
than under current practice. It is, perhaps, arguable that in these narrower
circumstances, cy pres relief would be appropriate. However, we remain
skeptical. Cy pres relief always gives rise to the danger of seductively
leading all involved to believe that the purposes of the substantive law
have been vindicated—when, in reality, the failure to compensate victims
will always represent a failure in those situations in which the substantive
law provides such relief as the sole remedy for law violation. The
unclaimed funds, then, should be treated in a manner that reveals to all the
failure (if only partial) of the remedial process.
With cy pres excluded as a possibility, two conceivable alternatives
remain: first, escheat to the state; and second, retention by the defendant.
The argument for escheat would proceed as follows: once the court has
entered judgment, the awarded funds become the property of the plaintiff.
If that plaintiff fails to collect the award, the unclaimed funds should be
treated in the same manner that any unclaimed property is treated—it
escheats to the state. Alternatively, it could be argued that in an adversary
system premised on a notion of private rights adjudication, unless and until
the plaintiff actually claims the award, it remains the property of the
defendant. To take defendant’s money solely for purposes of escheat to the
state effectively turns the private compensatory model (which, we assume
for present purposes, constitutes the sole enforcement mechanism
contained in the underlying substantive law) into the equivalent of a civil
fine. Neither the Rules Enabling Act nor dictates of democratic theory
permits this result. Thus, while resolution of this issue is beyond the scope
of our critique of class action cy pres, a strong argument can be made in
favor of retention of unclaimed funds by defendant. This approach would
presumably have the added advantage of confining plaintiffs’ attorneys’
fees to the funds actually claimed, since it would be incoherent to award to
the attorneys a percentage of funds retained by the defendant.
VII. CONCLUSION
Surprisingly, the federal courts’ growing use of cy pres relief in the
modern class action has—up to now—somehow managed to escape the
scathing scholarly critique it so richly deserves. While litigants may use cy
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pres to conceal the more generally acknowledged concerns with class
actions, cy pres exhibits numerous pathologies of its own. Cy pres
performs unconstitutional alchemy by effectively transforming the
underlying substantive law from a compensatory remedial model into a
civil fine by means of nothing more powerful than a procedural joinder
device. Cy pres also improperly transforms a bilateral dispute into a
trilateral proceeding by introducing into the adjudicatory mix an uninjured
third party who has no legitimate interest in the disposition of the suit. In
addition, cy pres threatens to undermine the due process interests of absent
class members by disincentivizing the class attorneys in their efforts to
assure the class–wide compensation of victims of the defendant’s unlawful
behavior. Finally, cy pres fosters the pathological aspects of modern class
action jurisprudence, including unconstitutional settlement classes and
highly dubious “faux” class actions.
Use of cy pres in the modern class action, without principled
justification, undermines the valid use of the class action process and
contravenes core constitutional dictates. It must therefore be abandoned by
the federal courts.
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